

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6432

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 AMMAN 9766

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

SUMMARY: I PRESENTED TO KING TALKING POINTS WHICH WERE WORKED OUT FOR MY VISIT, PUTTING EARLY STRESS OF FACT THAT THERE ARE LIMITS TO OUR POSITION IN FORTHCOMING DEBATE IN UNSC. KING SAID HE WAS PLEASED BY RECENT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT, THAT AREA IS TENSE AND UNCERTAIN AND THAT HE CONTINUES TO WORK TO HEAL EGYPT-SYRIAN RIFT. CONCLUDED THAT WE MAY BE AT THE END OF STEP BY STEP PROCESS. KING WAS INTERESTED IN ASAD RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION AND I TOLD HIM ASAD INITIALLY FELT THERE WAS "NO WINDOW" LEFT BY WHICH I HAD TO SAY, BUT THAT HE ALSO APPEARED NOT TO HAVE MADE UP HIS MIND YET ABOUT WHAT TO DO. THE KING REPEATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE SINAI ACCORD AND I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FORCEFULLY TO MAKE CLAR OUR CONCERN AND DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT THE RECENT SYRIAN JORDANIAN COMMUNIQUE AT THE FINISH OF THE ASAD VISIT HERE. THE KING TENDS TO BLAME EGYPT FOR THE SINAI ACCORD AND POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT IS NO LONGER IN HIS VIEW THE SOLE LEADER OF THE ARAB WORLD. THE KING NOTED HIS RECENT CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF SYRIAN POLITICAL COORDINATION WITH HIM AND SAID THAT HE NOW HAD AGREEMENT WITH ASAD FOR A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP ON KEY POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE KING SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIANS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCSS, BUT DID SO IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT EXCLUDE HIS OWN EVENTUAL RETURN TO THE TABLE. THE KING HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS

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THAT HE MIGHT TO GO GENEVA "IF REQUIRED" BUT WOULD

NOT REPRESENT PLO INTERESTS THERE. THE KING SAYD HE IS TODAY BRIEFING PLO ON HIS DECISION NOT TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN JORDAN.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND AMBASSADOR PICKERING PRESENT SHORTLY AFTERNOON DECEMBER 18. AFTER AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, THE KING REMARKED ON THE RECENT MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT HE SEES THE FUTURE WITH ANXIETY AND THAT THE AREA IS TENSE REGARDING THE UNCERTAINTITIES OF THE FUTURE. HE CONTINUED HIS INITIAL EXPOSITORY TALK BY NOTING THAT JORDAN HAD AND WOULD WORK HARD TO HEAL THE RIFT BETWEEN EGYPT AND SYRIA BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. HE FELT THAT WE MIGHT BE NOW AT THE END OF THE STEP BY STEP PROCESS AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT. HOWEVER THERE WOULD BE NO FUTURE IN A DIVISION OF THE ARAB WORLD. AT SOME POINT THERE MUST BE A MEETING BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS, IF ONLY TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON POSITION BETWEEN THEM ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, GENEVA AND FUTURE MOVES PLANS AND STRATEGY. THERE IS NOT MUCH WE CAN DO THE KING SAID RIGHT NOW TO PATCH UP THINGS IN THE AREA.

2. MEANWHILE HE CONTINUED THERE SEEMS TO BE A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ISRAELIS. CHANGES IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS CONTINUED AND NEW SETTLEMENTS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED. ISREAL FACES A SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEM AND THIS IS A DANGEROUS SITUATION. AS FOR SYRIAN HE SAID HE BELIEVES SYRIA WILL OFFER NO EXCUSE OR PROVOCATION TO ISREAL TO GO TO WAR. IN LEBANON HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS TRYING WITH SYRIA TO HELP TO GET THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL, BUT IT WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE DELIMNA.

3. I REPLIED THAT I WAS AS ALWAYS PLEASED TO SEE HIM AND WAS ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO HIM FOR PROVIDING ME WITH A CHANCE TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY IN AMMAN AND SHARE OUR IMPRESSIONS. THE KING SAID HE HOPES ALSO TO TALK WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY. (LATER GODLEY BRIEFED HUSSEIN ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND ANSWERED SOME OF HIS QUESTION--SEPTTEL) I CONTINUED THAT WE COULD

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UNDERSTAND THE KING'S DESIRE TO AVOID UNHELPFUL SPECULATION THROUGH PUBLICITY OF AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S VISIT. WE ARE NOT PLANNING ANYTHING WHILE HE IS HERE BUT DO WANT TO BE HELPFUL IN LEBANON IF THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH PEOPLE THINK IT CAN BE MANAGED. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN MENTIONED THE PAPER WHICH WAS DISCUSSED WITH HIM AT YOUR BREAKFAST MEETING AND I REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO NEW IDEAS TO OFFER. HASSAN SAID HE HAD ALSO DONE A PAPER AND HAD COME UP

WITH NOTHING NEW.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6433

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 AMMAN 9766

NODIS//CHEROKEE

4. I TOLD KING YOU WANTED ME TO MAKE THE TRIP WITH SPECIAL REFERNECE TO THE COMING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND THE NEED TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH ACCOMMODATION MIGHT BE REACHED AND ABLSO ABOUT THE LIMITS OF OUR OWN POSITION. I EMPHASIZED WE HAD REACHED NO US CONCLUSIONS BUT RATHER WANTED TO TALK TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA PRIOR TO THE MEETING SO THAT THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND THE LIMITS OF OUR OWN POSITION AND WE COULD SOLICIT AND PRESENT VIEWS. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT I HAD BEEN GIVEN FROM YOU PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD AND THENPROCEEDED TO DISCUSS THESE WITH HIM IN A DE- TAILED PRESENTATION.

5. AFTER I HAD FINISHED MY PRESENTATION THE KING THEN ASKED WHAT RESPONSE I HAD RECEIVED FROM ASAD. I TOLD THE KING THAT ASAD HAD APPEAREDINITIALLY PUZZLED BY THE US VIEW AND SEEMD TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE US APPROACH ALLOWED "NO WINDOW" FOR A MUTUALLY SUPPORT- ABLE OUTCOME. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT ASAD APPEARED NOT TO HAVE MADE UP HIS MIND AND MORE PARTICULARLY HAD NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO OFFER OR ANY SPECIFIC RESOLUTIONS. ASAD DID SAY HE WANTED AN OUTCOME WHICH THE US COULD SUPPORT AND ASKED FOR US IDEAS OF A RESOLUTION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE TOLD ASAD THAT WE HAD NOT YET COME THAT FAR. WE DO HOWEVER ASSUME THAT SYRIA WILL POSSIBLY MAKE PROPOSALS AND WE WILL WANT TO MAKE UP OUR OWN MIND

WHEN WE KNOW WHICH WAY THE SYRIANS ARE GOING.

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6. THE KING THEN SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE ME COME AND APPRECIATED THE CHANGE TO ESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH US. IT WAS ESPECIALLY GOOD FOR ME TO HAVE GONE TO SYRIANS AND THAT WE SHOULD STAY IN TOUCH AS MUCH AS WE POSSIBLY COULD. HE SAID HE HAD ANALYZED THE PROBLEM THE US KNOWS SYRIA'S VIEWS ON SINAI II WITH WHICH JORDAN TENDS TO AGREE. EGYPT GAVE TOO MUCH FOR TOO LITTLE IT RESULTED IN A DIVISION WHICH WAKENS THE ARAB WORLD. JORDAN THOUGHT THE ORIGINAL IDEA WOULD BE TO HAVE HAD ONE ROUND OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS THEN FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT AT GENEVA FOR A BROADER SETTLEMENT. THE SECOND STEP HAD COME OUT OF TURN. EGYPT'S REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE WHILE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WAS STILL OCCUPIED WAS A REAL PROBLEM. THE US REASSESSMENT IN WHICH ISRAEL WAS GIVEN A BIG MILITARY BOOST WAS LINKED IN THE ARAB MIND TO THE AGREEMENT. FOR THE ARABS THE EXISTING MILITARY IMBALANCE WITH ISRAEL HAD BEEN MADE MUCH LARGER.

7. THE KING CONTINUED THAT HE THOUGHT EGYPTIANS THEMSELVES WERE IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRAGEDY. EGYPTIAN BRIEFING OF THE OTHER ARABS HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT MADE PROPER PREPARATIONS FOR THE SINAI ACCORD. SADAT LACKED A CLEAR PICTURE OF POTENTIAL ARAB REACTIONS. SADAT WAS SURPRISED. THIS HAD FORCED A BASIC CHANGE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION SO THAT HUSSEIN HAD SUGGESTED DOING SOMETHING UNILATERALLY FOR SYRIA ON THE GOLAN TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE. THIS WAS NOW NOT POSSIBLE AND HAD BEEN BY-PASSED BY THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WE WERE ALSO LIING AT A GENEVA MEETING.

8. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ASAD, HE URGED HIM TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT SINAI ACCORD IS NOW OVERTAKEN BY OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. IF SYRIANS HAD FEARED A STALEMATE, THAT HAD NOT YET HAPPENED AND THERE HAD BEEN SOME INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS. SYRIA SHOULD LOOK FORWARD AND FIND AN OPENING TO BRING THE ARABS BACK TOGETHER IN AN

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EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO THE AREA. THE KING SAID THE SYRIANS WERE NOT CLOSE TO THIS POINT YET. EVENTUALLY THERE HAD TO BE AN EGYPT SYRIA MEETING AND HE HOPED IT WOULD HAPPEN REASONABLY SOON. HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER UNCERTAINTY. THE STEP BY STEP PROCESS OF LITTLE WITHDRAWALS WAS PROBABLY AT AN END, ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR STEP BY STEP IMPLEMENTATION OF A RESOLUTION OF THE BASIC PROBLEM OF ESTABLISHING PEACE IN THE AREA.

9. HUSSEIN ADDED THAT THERE WAS ONE POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE ARAB REACTION TO THE SINAI ACCORD. EGYPT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE SHEPHERD AND THE ARAB FLOCK FOLLOWED. THE SINAI ACCORD HAS CHANGED THIS IMPRESSION. IT HAS BEEN AN OLD PROBLEM -- THE CONCEPT THAT EGYPT IS EVERYTHING. HE ADDED OBVIOUSLY EGYPT IS STILL A VERY VERY IMPORTANT COUNTRY BUT THERE ARE OTHER ELEMENTS.

10. FROM THE SYRIANS POINT OF VIEW, THERE IS NOW AN EFFORT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PALESTINIANS PROBLEM NOT ON THEIR PROBLEM. THE SOVIETS (VINOGRADOV) HAVE TAKEN A SIMILAR POSITION THAT THE PALESTINIANS ISSUES IS A KEY QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED. THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY WANT TO USE GENEVA TO DO THIS. THE SYRIAN REACTION WHICH THE KING SHARES TO SOME EXTENT IS THAT THIS

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 AMMAN 9766

NODIS//CHEROKEE

IS NOT THE RIGHT APPROACH. THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS A KEY ELEMENT OF THE CASE AND MUST BE DEALT WITH.

"SOME TIME AGO WE TOLD YOU WE THOUGHT THAT THE USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT PROVIDE A NEEDED PUSH. THE SYRIANS HAVE TOLD US THEY FEEL IT IS NECESSARY TO BROADEN THE TALKS BEYOND THE US AND SOVIET UNION. THE INITIAL PROBLEM OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS CAN BE OVERCOME AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT BE A DECISION MAKING BODY. GENEVA WAS CREATED BY IT AND IT COULD PROVIDE A POSITIVE PUSH-- AN NEW OUTLINE OF HOW TO GO AHEAD".

11. AS FAR AS DETAILS AND TACTICS THE KING SAID HE SHARED MY IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NOT DONE ANY CONCLUSIVE PLANNING. DURING HIS LAST MEETING WITH ASAD HE HAD CONCENTRATED ON IMPROVING POLITICAL COORDINATION WITH THE SYRIANS, ONE ASPECT OF THE NEW JORDANIAN SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD TROUBLED HIM. THE SYRIANS HAD NOT COORDINATED WITH JORDAN AS SATISFACTORILY AS HE WANTED. ASAD HAD AGREED THAT BEFORE ANY FUTURE STEP THERE WOULD BE THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS SO THAT THEY COULD ARRIVE AT THE RIGHT RESULTS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THE KING EXPECTED SHORTLY TO BE ENGAGED WITH THE SYRIANS IN DEEP DISCUSSION. AS FOR A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE FOR GENEVA THE KING SAID HE HONESTLY DID NOT THINK IT WOULD ACHIEVE VERY MUCH-- IT MIGHT JUST BARELY KEEP THINGS GOING. I TOLD HIM I HAD NOT DETECTED MUCH ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS  
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APPROACH IN DAMASCUS. THE KING CONTINUED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION IS ALSO SO RIGID.

12. THE KING SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD WANT TO MOVE OUT WITH A POLICY WHICH WAS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN AND HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DO SO BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS FOR THE PALESTINIAN THE KING SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD PRESSED HIM TO ATTEND GENEVA, HE HAD ARGUED WITH THEM THAT THEY HAD ALWAYS PUSHED THE PALESTINIANS AND WHY WERE THEY CHANGING THEIR VIEWS NOW? CONTINUING HE SAID HE TOLD THE SOVIETS "WE BELIEVE VERY FIRMLY THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE". THERE IS NO BENEFIT TO JORDAN IN PLAYING A ROLE. WHAT BENEFIT IS THERE FOR US AFTER RABAT? JORDAN HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE ISRAELI POSITION" HE CONTINUED THE PALESTINIANS COULD USE OUR PARTICIPATION TO NEGATE OR OVERTURN ANY AGREEMENT. IF THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE WHY NOT LET THEM. IF THEY GAIN ANYTHING IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE A LASTING AGREEMENT. THE PALESTINIANS RELIED ON US BEFORE RABAT BUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IS FOR THEM A DILEMMA OF THE FIRST ORDER. NOW THEY HAVE TO BEGIN WHERE WE

WANTED TO BEGIN. WE HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THEY WILL DO. THE PLO ACHIEVED ITS POSITION BY ARMED STRUGGLE, NOT BY CONSENT OR ELECTION. IN POLITICAL MATTERS THINGS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM. IF THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THEM NEGOTIATE WHY NOT? BUT WE HAVE GREAT DOUBTS ABOUT THE ISRAELI POSITION. THEY ARE SO ADAMANT ABOUT NOT NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO.

13. I TOLD THE KING THAT I CAN SEE DIFFERENCES EMERGING BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAELI POSITION ON THE PLO, BUT ONLY IF THE FORMAL PLO POSITION ON THE EXISTENCE OF ISREAL AND UNSC RES 242 AND 338 IS MODIFIED. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE FORUM. WE COULD NOT BRING ISRAEL ALONG IN ANY FORUM AS LONG AS THE PLO SAID ISRAEL SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO. I NOTED FOR HIM THAT IF THE PLO DID SO US PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE ISRAELI POSITION WOULD BE SET BACK. THE CROWN PRINCE ASKED WHAT DOES ACCOMMODATING THE PLO MEAN AND WOULD THEY HAVE TO ACCEPT 242 AND 338. I REPLIED THAT IF THEY ACCEPT

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THE TWO RESOLUTIONS THEY ARE ACCEPTING ISRAELIS EXISTANCE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE WHICH WE WOULD RECIPROCATATE IN OUR APPROACH TO THEM. THIS WOULD CAUSE US SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL BUT IT WOULD GIVE US A BASIS TO GO TO THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT OUR POSITION BEING DESTROYED BY US PUBLIC OPINION. CROWN PRINCE ALSO ASKED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CHANGE IS THERE LIKELY TO BE ANYTING FURTHER FROM THE ISRAELIS POSSIBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALLON VISIT. I REPLIED THAT THE ISREALIS ARE IN A FERMENT AND THAT I THOUGHT ALLON WAS ONE OF THOSE THAT WANTED TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN.

14. I THEN REPORTED TO THE KING ON MY DISCUSSION IN SYRIAN WITH KHADDAM. I TOLD HIM THAT KHADDAM WAS CHARACTERISITALLY MORE DOGMATIC AND CATEGORICAL. HE HAD DEMANDED FULL ISREALI WITHDRAWAL RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, PARTICIPATION BY THE PALESTINIANS IN NEGOTATIONS THE FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEMENT TO PEACE A TIME TABLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN UNDER THE UNSYG WITH THE COUNCIL TO MEET AGAIN SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONSIDER

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 AMMAN 9766

NODIS/CHERKOKEE

THE PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE THIS IS PRECISELY A DEAD  
END APPROACH WHICH PUTS THE COUNCIL IN THE POSITION  
OF TRYING TO DETERMINE THE END RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATING  
PROCESS. IF THIS OCCURS, WE WILL BE ON A COLLISION  
COURSE WITH SYRIA. WE WANT TO AVOID IT. WE DO NOT  
WANT A COLLISION WITH SYRIANS OR WITH JORDAN BUT  
THERE ARE LIMITS TO OUR FLEXIBILITY. OUR CONCERN IS  
THAT THESE IDEAS FROM SYRIAN MAY BE ADOPTED.

15.I CONTINUED THAT FRANKLY SOME OF THE KING'S CLOSE  
FRIENDS IN AMERICA ARE PUZZLED. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU  
WERE SEVERELY DISAPPOINTED BY THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED  
AT THE END OF THE ASAD'S LAST VISIT TO AMMAN AND  
ESPECIALLY TO THE REFERENCES TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT  
AND TO THE STEP BY STEP PROCESS. IN OUR VIEW SINAI  
WAS A TURNING POINT FOR US PERCEPTIONS--IT BROUGHT  
OUT OUR INCREASING INVOLVEMENT AND THE WAY ARE INTERESTS  
ARE LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE MIDDLE EAST BY OUR  
OWN PUBLIC OPINION. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT WE NOT  
GO AHEAD SEPARATELY FROM JORDAN WE HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN  
FRANKLY AND WE DID SO NOT TO AVOID INCREASING  
DIVISIONS ON THE ISSUE.

16. THE KING REPLIED THAT THE REFERENCES IN THE  
COMMUNIQUE WERE THE LEAST THAT COULD BE PUT IN AND  
THE BEST THAT JORDAN COULD COME UP WITH WITH SYRIA.  
HE HAD WORKED HARD TO MODERATE SYRIANS VIEWS AND  
JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA ALLOWED THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE  
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MUCH MORE POSITIVE THAN THE SYRIANS WISHED. THE KING



SAID HE HAD BEEN FRANK WITH US IN SEPTEMBER ABOUT THE REACTIONS TO THE SINAI CCORD.

17. I TOLD HIM THAT WE THOUGHT THAT JORDAN HAD BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT URGING US TO TAKE ANOTHER STEP. THE KING REPLIED "YES BUT THE CONTENTS OF THE STEP WERENOT THAT GOOD", I THEN ASKED THE KING ABOUT THE FUTURE AND WHAT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. THE KING SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT I HAD COME. IN THE SYRIAN MIND THE US IS STILL HOSTILE AND FULLY SUPPORTS ISRAEL RIGHT OR WRONG. SYRIA BELIEVES IT HAS TO PUSH THE US HARD. IF THE US CONTINUED TO BE NAGATIVE THE SYRIANS SAY THEY KNOW WHERE THEY STAND AND THEY WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN TO ASSURE ISRAELI EXPULSION FROM THE UN. JORDAN IS TRYING TO MODIFY THAT POINT OF VIEW. THEY HAVE URGED ON THE SYRIANS THAT THERE ARE FRIENDS IN WASINGTON WHO WANT PEACE IN THE AREA. HE SAID FINALLY THE SYRIANS FEEL THE ELECTION IS NOT IMPORTANT. IF THE US WANTS PEACE IT SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO BRING IT ABOUT AND ITS SUCCESS IN THIS ENDEAVOR WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE US DOMESTIC SCENE. THE ARGUMENT THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE FOR A YEAR FOR THE SYRIANS IS NOT REALISTIC.

18. I TOLD THE KING THAT ASAD HAD SAID THAT DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PALESTINIANS WOULD RELIEVE ZIONIST PRESSURE ON THE US. I TOLD THE KING THAT I MADE CLEAR THAT NOTHING COULD BE MORE WRONG AND THAT THE PRESSURES WERE OVERWHELMINGLY HEAVY ON US TO VOTE AGAINST THE UNDOF RESOLUTION. WE STOOD FIRM BECAUSE WE THOUGHT IT WAS IN OUR INTERESTS TO DO SO. THERE WILL BE TREMENDOUS PRESSURES ON US IN JANUARY. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE ABOUT OUR POINT OF NO RETURN. WE ARE WILLING TO EXPLORE ACCOMMODATION WITHIN OUR LIMITS.

19. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN A LITTLE VAGUE ON WHAT TO DO NEXT. I SAID IN CONFIDENCE WHEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON SALT.

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HOWEVER THE SOVIETS PROPOSED NOW TO SET UP BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON ORGANIZING FOR GENEVA. WE HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED. THEIR DIRECTION IS CLEAR. THE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEM INTRIGUED WITH THE IDEA OF USING THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I TOLD THE KING THAT WE HAD HEARD THAT HE WAS SENDING A DELEGATION TO MOSCOW. THE KING SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE GOINGIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO DISCUSS MORE OF THE BACKGROUND ISSUES WITH THE SOVIETS

AND THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO MAKE A VISIT NEXT SPRING. I ALSO ASKED THE KING ABOUT REPORTS I HAD HEARD ABOUT THE PLO MIGHT BE REPRESENTED IN A JORDANIAN DELEGATION. THE KING TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO IT. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IF JORDAN'S PRESENCE WAS REQUIRED FOR GENEVA THEY MIGHT DO BUT THEY WOULD NOT REPRESENT PLO INTERESTS.

20. I REPEATED FOR THE KING THAT WE CONTINUED TO PREFER THAT JORDAN SHOULD BE THE NEGOTIATOR FOR THE WEST BANK. I ALSO NOTED THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENT WITH SYRIA HAVE PUZZLED SOME OF THE KING'S FRIENDS IN THE US WHO WERE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO SEEING THE RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPING AS IT APPARENTLY HAS. I SAID WE THINK YOU COULD BE HELPFUL ON KEEPING THE SYRIAN EYE ON REALITY BUT WE HAVE SOME GREAT CONCERNS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6436

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 AMMAN 9766

NODIS/CHEROKEE

WE COULD EITHER HAVE PROPAGANDA OR PROGRESS, RHETORIC OR REALITY. WE SEEM RECENTLY TO HAVE BEEN DRIFTING TO THE FORMER.

21. THE KING TOLD ME THAT TODAY HE WAS ADVISING THE PLO OF A DECISION WHICH HE HAD TAKEN ABOUT NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN JORDAN AFTER DEEP THOUGHT " WE WILL POSTPONE UNTIL A LATTER TIME ANY ELECTIONS. WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE STEPS TO HAVE ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE MOVES NOT IN OUR INTERESTS ON THE WEST BANK OR FOR THE ARABS TO CRITICIZE US. WE

KNOW THAT IF WE DO NOT HOLD ELECTIONS, WE WILL ALSO BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FOR FAILING TO IMPLEMENT THE RABAT DECISION. THE LESSER EVIL TO US APPEARS TO BE IS NOT GOING AHEAD".

22. I BRIEFED THE KING ON OUR STRONG STATEMENTS TO THE ISREALIS ON THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFTER THEY ANNOUNCED THE RECENT CABINET DECISION TO PUSH AHEAD. I TOLD HIM WE THOUGHT WE HAD DELAYED THE ISRAELI DECISION AND STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE ISRAELIS WHO WANTED TO END THE PROLIFERATION OF SETTLEMENTS. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID HE HOPED THAT WE COULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST BANK IN BOTH DIRECTIONS--IMPLYING THAT THEY HAD HOPED MORE ARABS COULD GO THERE AND SETTLE RATHER THAN THE PRESENT PROCESS THE ISRAELIS WERE FOLLOWING OF PUSHING PEOPLE OUT. HASSAN SAID HE EVENTUALLY HOPED FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE  
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WOULD BE MORE GENUINE WEST BANK AUTONOMY. I ENDED BY NOTING AGAIN THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TIMES FOR US AND THE ISRAELIS IN THE DAY AHEAD AND THAT WE DID ENVISAGE SOME MOVEMENT BUT THAT IT COULD NOT BE DRAMATIC.

23. THE KING ESPECIALLY ASKED THAT HIS GREETINGS BE PASSED ON TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT AND AGAIN THANKED ME FOR COMING.  
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